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Blinding Laser Weapons: New Limits on
the Technology of Warfare
ANN PETERS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Laws of armed conflict provide civilization with the tools to
overcome barbarity and to limit the destructiveness of warfare.
Even before the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, tribes, states
and religions rejected the use of particular weapons and tactics.
The ancient Laws of Manu prohibited Hindus from using poisoned
arrows; the Lateran Council in the Middle Ages declared the
crossbow an unchristian weapon.' The greater good of all human
beings may not have been the only motivation for prohibiting
particular weapons. A "mixture of self-interest [the self-interest
characteristically of a certain superior class or caste] and selective
humanitarianism" may also have motivated such prohibitions.2 In
either case, these prohibitions provide a foundation for the princi-
ples, laws and agreements that the international community has
* Consultant, Human Rights Watch Arms Project. J.D. Georgetown University Law
Center. The author, as a Human Rights Watch Arms Project representative, attended the
1995-1996 Review Conference for the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. The three Review Conference sessions were held in
Vienna and Geneva from September 25 to October 13, 1995, January 15 to 19, 1996, and
April 22 to May 3, 1996. The opinions expressed in this Article are the author's own.
1. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 29 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds.,
2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter WAR LAWS DOCUMENTS]; see also THE LAW OF WAR: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3-5 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972) [hereinafter A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY]. Commentators have questioned whether the real motivation behind these
ancient prohibitions of particular weapons or tactics was to reduce political or economic
risks to persons in power. For example, the Church supposedly declared the crossbow as
"odious to God" to protect its patron class because peasants used crossbows to attack
knights and nobles at long range: Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation
of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 61 & nn.41-43
(1994); see also Judith G. Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM.
J. INT'L L. 391, 395 n.27 (1993) (citing JAMES T. JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND
THE RESTRAINT OF WAR at xxiii, 128-39 (1981)).
2. GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 293 (1994).
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adopted to set limits on the weapons and tactics of war.
During the last decade, the military use of lasers has come
under increasing scrutiny. One of the first military applications of
laser technology came in the mid-1960s when lasers were used to
calculate the distance to a target.3 Today, many armored fighting
vehicles, helicopters, ships and aircraft have fire control systems
that include laser rangefinders or target designators to guide
missiles, bombs or rockets to their targets. Small hand-held laser
rangefinders are also in service. Furthermore, lasers are used in
weapon training simulation, communication, guidance and radar
systems.
4
The use of lasers as weapons against the human eye, however,
is distinct from these non-weapon military applications of laser
technology.5  More than two decades ago, the United States
entered the field of tactical laser weapons development. It
strenuously resisted any restrictions on this new generation of
conventional weapons until late 1995, shortly before the interna-
tional community banned the use and transfer of certain blinding
laser weapons through its adoption of Protocol IV, the Protocol on
Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), at the first Review Confer-
3. Scientific work during the 1950s led to the invention of the laser. BENGT
ANDERBERG & MYRON L. WOLBARSHT, LASER WEAPONS: THE DAWN OF A NEW
MILITARY AGE 12-13, 43 (1992). Field-deployed rangefinders from several countries were
seen as early as the mid-1960s. Id. at 4, 12-14. During the 1970s, military planners began
to focus more on this technology, with an eye toward the possible development of laser
weapons. Id. at 14, 43. See also OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
ACQUISITION & TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FY96 ELECTRONIC WARFARE
PLAN (1995) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC WARFARE PLAN] (giving several examples of laser
technology: laser rangefinders, target designators, guided missiles, laser pulse jamming
techniques, laser warning devices, electro-optic countermeasures and infrared countermea-
sures).
4. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 3, at 5.
5. Human Rights Watch Arms Project uses the term "tactical laser weapons" to
distinguish low-energy laser weapon systems from high-energy or non-weapon laser
systems. High-energy lasers are associated with ballistic missile defenses as well as the
Reagan Administration's "Star Wars" concept articulated in 1983. Non-weapon laser
systems include laser rangefinders and target designators. See United States: U.S. Blinding
Laser Weapons, HUM. RTS. WATCH ARMS PROJECT (Human Rights Watch, New York,
N.Y.), May 1995, at 3-4 [hereinafter U.S. Blinding Lasers]; Blinding Laser Weapons: The
Need to Ban a Cruel and Inhumane Weapon, HUM. RTS. WATCH ARMS PROJECT (Human
Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 1995 [hereinafter Blinding Laser Weapons]. "Laser
weapons use the laser beam as a weapon, not as an aid to another weapon. The distinction
between tactical laser weapons, and laser rangefinders and target designators is in the
function, mission or intent. Tactical laser weapons should be defined as weapons that use
a laser beam as the primary kill mechanism." Id. at 24.
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ence of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to
Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
(CCW).
6
The international ban on laser weapons is a landmark decision,
reaffirming that weapons that cause unnecessary suffering are not
to be used in war. While the use of a few weapons has been
prohibited since the 1868 ban on exploding projectiles, the ban on
blinding laser weapons marks the first time in more than 100 years
that use of a specific weapon has been banned before its widescale
deployment.7 Furthermore, the ban represents the first time ever
that both use and transfer of a prohibited conventional weapon
have been outlawed.
Protocol IV, its negotiating history, and its possible interpreta-
tions evidence how the military and politicians may respond to
international efforts to prohibit or restrict weapons and methods of
warfare through internationally recognized principles and agree-
ments. For example, the language of Protocol IV may be inter-
preted to undermine the principles upon which it is based and the
spirit behind its prohibitions. A high-level U.S. legal memoran-
dum, which was written after Protocol IV's adoption, shows how
the military may attempt to circumvent Protocol IV and use
blinding laser weapons.' One of the most disturbing statements in
6. See Additional Protocol to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or
to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV),
CCW/CONF.I/7 (Oct. 12, 1995) [hereinafter Protocol IV]. The Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to
Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) is more commonly
referred to as the Convention on Conventional Weapons or the Inhumane Weapons
Convention. The first CCW Review Conference adopted Protocol IV on October 13, 1995.
Twenty countries must consent to be bound by Protocol IV before it enters into force.
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
opened for signature Apr. 10, 1981, art. 5, para. 3, 19 I.L.M. 1524, 1526 [hereinafter CCW].
7. The Vienna Review Conference: Success on Blinding Laser Weapons but Deadlock
on Landmines, INT'L REV. RED CROSS (Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Geneva, Switz.),
Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 672, 676-77.
8. Id.
9. Memorandum from W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant for Law of War Matters,
Office of the Judge Advocate General, U.S. Department of the Army, on Effect of Laser
Protocol on U.S. Army Programs to Major Kilgallin (Nov. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Effect of
Laser Protocol Memo]. The memorandum is described as a "preliminary analysis," but it
is signed for the Judge Advocate General. No other analysis had been made public by
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the memorandum is that the State Parties sought to prohibit only
mass blinding of combatants, not the blinding of individuals. °
Such an interpretation, although subsequently dismissed by U.S.
Secretary of Defense William Perry," may give credence to a
more cynical, or some would say realistic, interpretation of the laws
of armed conflict. In short, such an interpretation concludes that
more elaborate legal agreements develop "apace with the increas-
ing savagery and destructiveness of modern war."' 2  Others view
the purpose of the laws of armed conflict, however, as "almost
entirely humanitarian in the literal sense of the word, namely, to
prevent or mitigate suffering and, in some case.s, to rescue life from
the savagery of battle and passion.'
' 3
Military applications of laser technology are not confined to
military use. U.S. law enforcement has considered use of the
technology under the rubric of less-than-lethal force. 4 Through
a memorandum of understanding between the Department of
Defense and the Department of Justice, civilian law enforcement
now has the opportunity to gain such military technology. Law
enforcement's concerns in deciding whether to use particular
weapons and tactics differ from the military's considerations.
May 1996. See also Letter from Patrick Leahy, Senator, and Lane Evans, Member of
Congress, to William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense (Apr. 18, 1996) [hereinafter Letter to
Perry].
10. Effect of Laser Protocol Memo, supra note 9.
11. Letter from William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, to Lane Evans, Member of
Congress (May 8, 1996) [hereinafter Letter to Evans]. Secretary Perry unequivocally stated
that both the CCW and the Department of Defense policy prohibited the use of laser
weapons designed specifically to cause permanent blindness against an individual
combatant. Id. See also infra notes 115-125 and accompanying text.
12. Jochnick & Normand, supra note 1, at 55.
13. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 1952 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 360, 363-64.
14. "Less-than-lethal force" is only one name given to this type of technology. Other
names include non-lethal, less-lethal and non-lethal force, and soft-kill, pre-lethal and dis-
abling technologies. See, e.g., Jon B. Becker & Charles Heal. Less-Than-Lethal Force:
Doctrine Must Lead the Technology Rush. JANE'S INT'L DEF. REV., Feb. 1996, at 62. The
U.S. Department of Defehse and other militaries generally have used the term "non-
lethal." U.S. Department of Defense, Draft Non-Lethal Weapons Policy (July 21, 1994);
see also Christopher Parent, Draft Policy Directive Spells Out DOD's Rules for Non-lethal
Weapons, INSIDE PENTAGON, July 13, 1995, at 1; Barbara Starr, USA Defines Policy on
Non-lethal Weapons, JANE'S DEF. WKLY., Mar. 6, 1996, at 6; COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, NON-LETHAL TECHNOLOGIES: MILITARY OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS:
REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE 12 (1995). Laser weapons have been included
and excluded from the category of less-than-lethal technologies or non-lethal weapons. For
a brief discussion of this issue, see Blinding Laser Weapons, supra note 5, at 14-15.
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There is, however, one common underlying issue: whether the
military or law enforcement should use a weapon that specifically
targets a part of the body, particularly the eye.
This Article aims to provide an understanding of the critical
issues that arise in the development, production and use of laser
weapons, whether by the soldier, the peacekeeper, the prison
guard, or the police officer. Specifically, this Article focuses on
tactical laser weapons that can be directed against the eyes of an
individual and whose function is to target sight. Part II of this
Article examines the physical characteristics of lasers in general
and details the development of tactical laser weapons, particularly
within the U.S. military. Part III provides background on the 1995
international ban on certain blinding laser weapons and looks at
efforts to better define "unnecessary suffering" and "superfluous
injury." Further, Part III considers the status of laser weapons
during armed conflicts under international law and the internation-
al ban. Part IV briefly highlights the possible use of laser weapons
by civilian law enforcement agencies. Particular non-weapon laser
technology, whether in the military or law enforcement context,
may make the weapons and force used more discriminate, but
blinding tactical laser weapons that are directed against the human
eye have no place in armed conflicts or in police operations. Use
of these weapons violates the basic principle against unnecessary
suffering to combatants, as well as basic ethical considerations in
the treatment of suspects. The ban on blinding laser weapons,
countries' statements in support of more comprehensive measures
to prohibit blinding as a method of warfare, and state practice
support this new agreement to ban certain blinding laser weapons,
which builds upon the fundamental humanitarian principles within
the laws of armed conflict.
II. LASER WEAPONS AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. The Operation of Lasers
Laser is an acronym for "light amplification by the stimulated
emission of radiation." The eye is the organ that is most sensitive
to a laser's rapid effect.'5 The extent of damage depends primari-
15. See, e.g., BLINDING WEAPONS: REPORTS OF THE MEETINGS OF EXPERTS
CONVENED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITEE OF THE RED CROSS ON BATTLEFIELD
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ly on the wavelength and energy or power level used. 16 Particular
lasers may damage the eye in less than a fraction of a second.1
7
The eye sees the light coming from a point source and focuses the
laser beam onto the retina, the most sensitive part of the eye.'8
When a person uses direct-view optics, such as binoculars, the
potential for damage and blindness is greater because the optics
collect more light together, and thus, magnify the laser's intensity.
The laser beam is silent and the energy within it moves at the
speed of light. 9 It is possible to design lasers that emit energy at
several wavelengths simultaneously, making it difficult to develop
protective measures," One disadvantage of tactical laser weapons
is that they are line-of-sight weapons and thus their use in military
operations is limited.
Lasers may be classified into at least four power level catego-
ries." The lowest Class I lasers are intrinsically safe. They
include bar-code readers in supermarket checkout counters and
compact disc players.2 The highest Class IV lasers can damage
eyes, as well as burn skin, cloth and other materials, depending on
the exposure time. 3 It may not be safe even to view the lasers'
diffuse reflections. Class IV lasers include surgical lasers and lasers
with potential military applications. 4 At least two U.S. laser
weapon systems-the LCMS and Dazer-use Class IV lasers.
The Chinese laser weapon system, the ZM-87, is advertised as
having a peak output of fifteen megawatts, 26 and experts believe
LASER WEAPONS 1989-1991, at 29-37, 97-99 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1993) [hereinafter
ICRC REPORT ON BLINDING WEAPONS]; ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 3, at
71-73, 90-94, 145-154; Bengt Anderberg, The Low-Energy Laser Aimed at the Eye as
Potential Personnel Weapon, 1988 RUSI J. 35, 36.
16. Anderberg, supra note 15, at 36.
17. See ICRC REPORT ON BLINDING WEAPONS, supra note 15, at 30.
18. Anderberg, supra note 15, at 36.
19. See ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 3, at 21-25.
20. See id.
21. See generally id. at 24-25; Malcolm W. Browne, Lasers for the Battlefield Raise
Concern for Eyesight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,1988; ICRC REPORT ON BLINDING WEAPONS,
supra note 15, at 102-112.
22. See ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 3, at 24.
23. Id. at 4, 81.
24. Id. at 24-25.
25. See William Arkin, Ban on Tactical Laser Weapons, DoD Maintains Blinding is Not
Violation of War, DEF. NEWS, July 17-23, 1995, at 20.
26. China North Industries Corporation, ZM-87 Portable Laser Disturber Fact Sheet
(on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal)
[hereinafter ZM-87 Fact Sheet].
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that it also uses a Class IV laser.
By comparison, lasers operate either at in-band or out-of-band
wavelengths. Lasers operating at in-band wavelengths are within
the visible and near-infrared range, approximately 400 to 1400
nanometers. 27 This range is sometimes referred to as the retinal
hazard zone.2 8 Lasers operating at in-band wavelengths produce
the most severe eye damage, including blindness. The energy in
the visible and near-infrared range easily penetrates the cornea and
the lens and is absorbed at the retina, the most sensitive part of the
eye.29 Low-energy lasers operating in the visible or near-infrared
part of the spectrum are able to "damage [a person's] eyes and, in
effect, cause blindness."30  Many laser rangefinder and target
designator field systems operate at 1064 nanometers, such as the
rangefinder on the M1 Abrams tank and the AH-64 Apache Target
Acquisition and Designation System.3 By comparison, the Dazer
weapon system operates at 755 nanometers, and the Saber 203
visible laser illuminator operates in the upper 600 nanometers.
32
Lasers operating at out-of-band wavelengths are within the far-
infrared and ultraviolet ranges. The energy in the far-ultraviolet
and far-infrared range is absorbed or reflected at the surface,
though the energy may still damage the cornea. The energy in the
near-ultraviolet range penetrates the lens and may penetrate the
retina. Lasers operating at out-of-band wavelengths can also cause
eye damage, affecting the cornea more often than the retina. Such
lasers cause extremely painful injuries that instantly incapacitate a
person and require immediate medical care.33
B. The Development of Laser Weapons
After decades of research and development in laser weapons
and years of opposition to any regulation of these weapons, the
U.S. Department of Defense announced its policy on laser weapons
in September 1995. The new policy prohibited "the use of lasers
27. See Anderberg, supra note 15, at 36-37; ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note
3, at 71-73, 150.
28. Anderberg, supra note 15, at 36.
29. Id.
30. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 3, at 2.
31. Blinding Laser Weapons, supra note 5, app. 3.
32. Id.
33. Anderberg, supra note 15, at 36-37; Bengt Anderbeig & Ove Bring, Battlefield
Laser Weapons and International Law, 1988 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 457, 461.
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specifically designed to cause permanent blindness of unenhanced
vision" and supported international negotiations to accomplish that
end.' In explaining the policy, a spokesman said that Secretary
of Defense William Perry "felt strongly that we should take a lead
role ... by swearing off the development and use of lasers
intentionally designed to blind people., 35  Senior Pentagon
officials said that the policy statement was a major shift in U.S.
Department of Defense policy and was intended to establish the
unacceptability of blinding as a method of warfare.36
The Department of Defense policy marked a turning point for
the United States, which had steadfastly opposed any restrictions,
let alone a ban, on laser weapons during international negotiations
leading to the first Review Conference of the CCW. Between 1975
and 1976, U.S. defense manufacturers began development of
specific tactical laser weapon systems when Martin Marietta and
Sanders Associates, now Lockheed Sanders, received military
contracts to develop laser weapon systems for attack helicopters.
3 7
Subsequent technological developments focused on ground-based
laser weapons and moved to hand-held systems. Martin Marietta
developed the vehicle-mounted Stingray laser weapon system and
its outgrowth, Outrider, for the Army and the Marine Corps.
Meanwhile, three other companies competed to develop a portable
tactical laser weapon: Allied-Signal developed Dazer; McDonnell-
Douglas developed Cobra; and Lockheed Sanders developed the
Laser Countermeasure System (LCMS).38 Ultimately, the LCMS
became the Army's most advanced portable tactical laser weapon
system. In 1995, the LCMS came under some of the closest
34. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, News
Release, DoD Announces Policy on Blinding Lasers (Sept. 1, 1995).
35. Kevin H. Bacon, Department of Defense News Briefing (Oct. 12, 1995)
(Defenselink Transcript).
36. Blinding Laser Weapons, supra note 5. at 5.
37. U.S. Blinding Lasers, supra note 5, at 4. Flight tests for the Lockheed prototype,
the ALQ-169 Optical Warning Location/Detection device, began in 1980, but the program
was cancelled in 1986. See FORECAST INT'L, ELECTRONIC WARFARE: AIRBORNE
ELECTRO-OPTICAL COUNTERMEASURES, FORECAST INTERNATIONAL/DMS MARKET
INTELLIGENCE REPORT (1993). The tank- and helicopter-mounted C-CLAW, or Close
Combat Laser Assault Weapon, was developed in the early 1980s, but it was cancelled in
1983. See id; see also Jeff Hecht, Lasers Designed to Blind, NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 8, 1992,
at 27, 28.
38. U.S. Blinding Lasers, supra note 5, at 5.
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scrutiny of all U.S. tactical laser weapons programs. 39
While U.S. military studies supported the development of
tactical laser weapons as "highly effective force multipliers,"4 the
military also raised questions about the use of such systems against
the human eye. In the late 1970s, U.S. intelligence reported on
Soviet interest in tactical laser weapons and warned of the dangers
of blinding by lasers.4' During the Reagan administration,
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger again raised concerns
about the use of blinding lasers and condemned the possible Soviet
development of such laser weapons. Secretary Weinberger said
that the Soviets had the technological capability to deploy low-
power laser weapons "at least for [anti-personnel] use and against
soft targets. 4 2  At that time, U.S. military officials did not
distinguish between the possible use of laser weapons against
soldiers' "unenhanced" and "enhanced" vision. One of their
conclusions was simply that the "morale problems from battlefield
lasers are horrendous.,
43
In 1989, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a
bilateral agreement to prevent so-called dangerous military
activities, including laser use that might harm personnel or damage
equipment of the other party's armed forces." Although the
agreement was limited to peacetime activities, it revealed both the
39. In May 1995, Human Rights Watch publicly detailed for the first time ten U.S.
tactical laser weapons programs. Blinding Laser Weapons, supra note 5, at 4 (citing U.S.
Blinding Lasers, supra note 5). At least five of those systems-LCMS, Stingray, Outrider,
Dazer and Cobra-already had been introduced into prototype form and were available
for use in certain circumstances. Id. Subsequently, Human Rights Watch identified six
additional laser weapon programs in U.S. military laboratories, a Marine Corps "validated
requirement" for a laser weapon, and several other laser systems "whose blinding effects
or potential for collateral damage [was] unclear, but [bore] further investigation." Id.
40. U.S. Blinding Lasers, supra note 5, at 4 (citing CONCEPTS ANALYSIS AGENCY, U.S.
DEP'T OF THE ARMY, STUDY REPORT CAA-SR-80-8, MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF LASER
EMPLOYMENT BY THE SOVIETS (MILES) (1981); TRADOC SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AGENCY,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, TRASANA TR-33-83, FORWARD AREA DIRECTED ENERGY
WEAPONS (FADEW) STUDY (1983)).
41. Id.
42. George C. Wilson, Pentagon Annual Says Soviets Able to Deploy Blinding Laser
Weapons, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1987, at 1; Warren Strobel, Pentagon Accelerates Counter-
Laser Studies, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1987. The Pentagon accelerated research in
countering laser attacks because it faced a growing number of incidents in which the
Soviets had turned an experimental shipborne laser on Western military personnel and
equipment. Wilson, supra, at 1, 6.
43. Wilson, supra note 42, at 1.
44. Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, June 12,1989, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., 28 I.L.M. 877 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1990).
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serious threat of lasers and the strong interest in tactical laser
weapons development.4 5  In spite of the treaty, four laser inci-
dents involving Soviet ships and U.S. aircraft were reported in
October and November 1989, including one situation that resulted
in "visual injury" to a U.S. crew member.46
According to the Department of Defense's Fiscal Year 1996
Electronic Warfare Plan, thirty countries are involved in the
military use of lasers, which includes non-weapon system laser
rangefinders and target designators.47 These countries have laser
research programs "either in the form of a domestic development
program or through the acquisition and application of commercially
available technologies.,
48
Modifications to laser rangefinders and target designators
render any laser a potential weapon, making the eyesight of
individuals and optical devices "especially vulnerable., 49  Many
low-energy lasers are readily available on the commercial market,
and most of them "present a danger to the unaided human eye and
[electro-optical] sensors at a range out to [three nautical miles],"
which is roughly equal to three miles.5" The Department of
Defense Electronic Warfare Plan concluded that "[low-energy
lasers] can damage eyes and sensors, disrupt a pilot's attention
from flight instruments and obscure the scene outside the cockpit,
and degrade weapon system sensors. Iran, Iraq, Libya, North
Korea, and Syria are believed to have genuine interest in convert-
ing commercial-grade lasers into antihuman/[electro-optical] sensor
45. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 3, at 214. A 1987 Pentagon report
catalogues one particular incident involving a Soviet ship and two U.S. military aircraft.
Id. at 142-43. The Defense Intelligence Agency claimed that a co-pilot was impaired for
ten minutes, and U.S. authorities publicly said that a laser was involved. Id. Two experts
on lasers and their effects on the eye, however, have questioned the exact nature of the
injury and the incident. Id. Although flash blinding without damage is only possible when
the eye is adapted to the dark, the light affected no other crew member, and no other crew
member reported indirectly viewing a bright light on the ship. Id. At least two U.S.
service personnel received laser injuries in separate incidents during the Gulf War against
Iraq. See Thomas H. Mader et al., Ocular and Ocular Adnexal Injuries Treated by United
States Military Ophthalmologists During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 100
OPHTHALMOLOGY 1462 (1993); Blinding Laser Weapons, supra note 5, at 20-21.
46. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 3, at 144.
47. ELECTRONIC WARFARE PLAN, supra note 3, at 2-13.
48. Id.
49. U.S, Marine Corps, Mission Need Statement (MNS) for the Active Laser
Countermeasure System (ALCS) (No. Log 47) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Journal) [hereinafter Mission Need Statement].
50. ELECTRONIC WELFARE PLAN, supra note 3, at 2-13.
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weapons."51
At a 1995 weapons exhibition, China North Industries
Corporation, or Norinco, marketed a portable, tripod-mounted
"laser disturber" known as the ZM-87. In describing its applica-
tions, sales literature said that the laser weapon could "injure or
dizzy" eyes and damage photo-electric optical sensors.52 Officials
in the Pentagon's Directorate for Combating Terrorism believed
that the ZM-87 was aimed at buyers from Third World "rogue
states," though it was unclear why a distinction between so-called
rogue states and any other country or non-state entity was
necessary.53
The U.S. Marine Corps appears acutely aware of the problem
of laser weapons' proliferation. In its analysis of the threats from
opponents' lasers, it noted: "Marines using binoculars, laser
rangefinders and laser target designators now risk permanent
blindness if they employ these devices toward the enemy [because]
[e]nemies employing frequency agile lasers can deny us use of our
optical devices and the ability to look directly toward the ene-
my."
54
According to some estimates, by 1995, the United Stateshad
spent more than $400 million on research and testing of tactical
laser weapons, but had not fully fielded a single system.55 Devel-
opment and production of tactical laser weapons advanced through
1995, even as the United States undertook a review of its policy
and prepared for the CCW Review Conference, which led to
Protocol IV's ban on blinding laser weapons. In the course of less
than two months, the United States contracted to produce its most
advanced tactical laser weapon, the LCMS, and then cancelled the
program. On August 31, 1995, the day before the Department of
51. Id.
52. Peter Felstead, China Markets Blinding Laser, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV.
POINTER, June 1995, at 1; ZM-87 Fact Sheet, supra note 26.
53. Nick Cook, Chinese Laser 'Blinder' Weapon for Export, JANE'S DEF. WKLY., May
27, 1995, at 3.
54. Mission Need Statement, supra note 49.
55. Blinding Laser Weapons, supra note 5, at 4. In 1994, Brigadier General Jack Nix,
Jr., assistant commandant for the U.S. Army Infantry School, stated, "[Ojur country has
allocated resources to support testing and to write requirements that have resulted in the
spending of hundreds of millions of dollars. Nevertheless, except for the two Stingray
Systems that were taken to Desert Storm and have since been disassembled, we have not
fielded any systems." Jack Nix, Jr., Keynote Speech at the Fifteenth Annual Lasers on the
Modem Battlefield Conference (Feb. 28, 1994).
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Defense issued its policy statement, the military awarded a $16.8
million contract to Lockheed Sanders, Inc. of Nashua, New
Hampshire for the production of fifty actual and twenty-five low-
power training units of the LCMS.5 6 The contract was part of a
$275 million program that called for procurement of approximately
2500 of the systems, each costing between $85,000 and $100,000.1
7
The development of specific tactics and doctrine regarding tactical
laser weapons was still in "the planning stages" during this time,58
even though the military should have been aware of the need to
implement specific guidelines for -such controversial weapon
systems well in advance of production. The Deputy Secretary of
Defense subsequently ordered the termination of the LCMS
program on October 5, 1995,"9 while U.S. delegates to the CCW
Review Conference were finalizing the terms of a blinding laser
weapons protocol, which they had helped to limit despite calls by
other countries, including NATO allies, for more comprehensive
measures.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BLINDING LASER WEAPONS
The modern basis for outlawing particular weapons and
methods of warfare rests on several pillars. First, parties to a
conflict do not have unlimited discretion in their choice of means
and methods of warfare. Second, parties are not prohibited from
using means and methods of warfare that are of a nature to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. Third, the military
must not use a weapon or method of warfare when humanitarian
considerations outweigh its military necessity. Fourth, the dictates
of established custom, humanity and public conscience, known as
the Martens Clause, ensure that particularly abhorrent weapons are
56. Blinding Laser Weapons. supra note 5, at 9.
57. Letter from Michael W. McKinney, U.S. Department of the Army, to David
Isenberg, America's Defense Monitor (Aug. 2, 1995); Blinding Laser Weapons, supra note
5, at 9.
58. Letter from Gilbert F. Decker, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Research,
Development and Acquisition, to Joost Hiltermann and Stephen Goose. Human Rights
Watch Arms Project (July 7, 1995).
59. Memorandum from the Secretary of the Army on Termination of the Laser
Countermeasure System to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Oct. 5, 1995). See infra note
114 for excerpts from a draft blinding laser weapons protocol that was submitted to the
CCW Review Conference after preparatory meetings ended in January 1995.
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not used, even if no specific prohibitions exist.' These four
pillars are intended to safeguard combatants. The underlying
principle is that the actual conduct of armed conflicts warrants
assessment and regulation.6 t Specific prohibitions or restrictions
follow from this principle.
The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 (St. Petersburg
Declaration), which is regarded as the first major international
agreement to prohibit the use of a particular weapon in warfare,
62
banned the use of explosive projectiles weighing less than 400
grams. 63  Projectiles of more than 400 grams were not less lethal,
but those under that weight caused excessive damage. Not to
detract from this prohibition, the importance of the St. Petersburg
Declaration is often acknowledged as lying more in its preamble
than in its specific provisions. The international Military Commis-
sion that assembled at St. Petersburg agreed to fix "the technical
limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the require-
ments of humanity."'  The prohibition was justified by the
following principles:
That the progress of civilization should have the effect of
alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war;
60. The Preamble to Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land contains the provisions of the Martens Clause:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants remain under the protection and
the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages
established among civilised peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates
of public conscience.
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
pmbl., reprinted in WAR LAWS DOCUMENTS, supra note 1, at 45 [hereinafter Hague
Convention IV]. Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 contains the same principle: "In cases not covered by this Protocol or by
other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and
authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the
principles of humanity and from the dictates of the public conscience." Additional Protocol
I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, June 8, 1977, art. 1, reprinted in WAR
LAWS DOCUMENTS, supra note 1, at 390 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
61. The theories of just war and the conduct of war overlap. Even though the writings
of Hugo Grotius showed little evidence of restraint on the conduct of warfare, he
distinguished between the legal rules and "what was morally desirable in the conduct of
warfare." Gardam, supra note 1, at 396 & n.30.
62. WAR LAWS DOCUMENTS, supra note 1, at 29.
63. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under
400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec.11, 1868, reprinted in WAR LAWS DOCUMENTS, supra
note 1, at 31.
64. Id. at 30.
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That the only legitimate object which States should endeavor to
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the
enemy;
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest
possible number of men;
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms
which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or
render their death inevitable;
That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary
to the laws of humanity.
65
Based on these statements, the St. Petersburg Declaration is seen
as expressing the "customary principle prohibiting the means of
warfare causing unnecessary suffering., 66  The 1977 Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Additional Protocol
I) and the 1980 CCW were the most recent codifications of this
principle. Specifically, Additional Protocol I conferred "indepen-
dent status,6 7 on the principle by incorporating it into Article 35,
titled "Basic Rules," which states:
1. In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict
to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.
2. It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material
and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury
or unnecessary suffering.68
Additional Protocol I also codifies the customary law duty to
implement a treaty or customary rule in good faith.69 Article 36
states:
[I]n the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new
weapon, means or methods of warfare, a High Contracting Party
is under an obligation to determine whether its employment
65. Id. at 30-31.
66. Id. 'Subsequent agreements renounced the use of particular means of warfare. The
1899 Hague Declaration prohibited the use of dum-dum bullets, which expand or flatten
easily in the human body. Hague Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, July
29, 1899, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTs 103 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri
Toman eds., 1981). The 1907 Hague Convention prohibited the use of poison or poisoned
weapons. Hague Convention IV, supra note 60.
67. Henri Meyrowitz, The Principle of Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering,
From the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 to Additional Protocol I of 1977, INT'L REV.
RED CROSS (Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Geneva, Switz.), Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 98, 102.
68. Additional Protocol I, supra note 60, art. 35.
69. Louise Doswald-Beck & Gerald C. Cauderay, The Development of New Anti-
Personnel Weapons, INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS (Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross,
Geneva, Switz.), Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 565, 565.
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would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this
Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to
the High Contracting Party. 0
Combatants therefore are protected from weapons that cause
unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. They are also
protected by society's placement of certain weapons and methods
of warfare, such as intentional blinding, outside the limits of armed
conflict. These are fundamental, reasonable humanitarian
principles.
A. Proportionality and Military Necessity
A basic principle of the law of armed conflict is the need to
weigh military necessity against humanitarian considerations. Its
purpose is to safeguard combatants from excessive and unnecessary
harm.7 1 Under the proportionality rule, "a weapon may either
inherently cause unnecessary suffering, and thus all use is prohibit-
ed, or it may cause such suffering in certain cases only and
therefore these uses are proscribed. 7 2 Two questions then arise:
(1) What is the definition of "military necessity"?; and (2) What
are the definitions of "unnecessary suffering" and "superfluous
injury"?
Such phrases as "indispensable," "essential," "urgent need,"
and "strictly necessary" have been offered as part of attempts to
state what may be done to attain the military's goals and the aims
of war. One criticism of "military necessity" is its elasticity, which
has "enabled belligerents to legally justify virtually any conduct
otherwise available to proponents of kreigraison."73 Advocates of
70. Additional Protocol I, supra note 60, art. 36.
71. See generally Gardam, supra note 1; Doswald-Beck & Cauderay, supra note 69.
The proportionality rule originally safeguarded combatants and has since been incorporated
into laws protecting civilians. According to historian Geoffrey Best, the law of armed
conflict was less concerned with protecting civilians than combatants before 1945. Geoffrey
Best, Restraints on War by Land Before 1945, in RESTRAINTS ON WAR: STUDIES IN THE
LIMITATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS 27 (Michael Howard ed., 1979).
72. L. Doswald-Beck, Lawfulness of the Anti-Personnel Use of Laser Weapons, in
ICRC REPORT ON BLINDING WEAPONS, supra note 15, at 330, 331.
73. Jochnick & Normand, supra note 1, at 64. The term kreigraison derives from the
German phrase "kreigraison geht vor kreigsmanier," which translates as "the necessities
of war are prior to the custom of war." .Id. at 63 n.53. For further discussion of this
doctrine, see id. at 63-65. In the words of Elihu Root, "As the belligerent is to be the sole
judge of the necessity, the doctrine really is that a belligerent may violate the law or
repudiate it or ignore it whenever that is deemed to be for its military advantage." William
G. Downey, Jr., The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 251,253 (1953).
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kreigraison argue that the demands of military necessity should
always override the obligations of international law.
However, Francis Lieber, who prepared the historic Instruc-
tions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field during the Civil War, wrote that military necessity consists in
the necessity "of those measures which are indispensable for
securing the ends of war, and which are lawful according to the
modern law and usages of war., 74  Under the Lieber Code,
enacted in 1863 and considered a cornerstone of humanitarian law,
military necessity "does not admit of cruelty-that is, the infliction
of suffering for the sake of suffering or revenge" and it "does not
include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace
unnecessarily difficult. ' 75  Similarly, author Michael Walzer
concluded that it is important to "weigh the mischief done, which
presumably means not only the immediate harm to individuals but
also any injury to the permanent interests of mankind, against the
contribution that the mischief makes to the end of victory. 76
From the military's perspective, a commander must also help
identify conduct or means and methods of warfare that have
marginal military advantage, "particularly when there are indica-
tions such conduct may interfere with the successful conclusion of
peaceful relations.,
77
In its commentary on the Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Convention, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
said that military necessity can never "justify a degree of violence
which exceeds the level strictly necessary to ensure the success of
a particular operation in a particular case., 78  By comparison,
another commentator defined military necessity as "an urgent need,
74. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,
General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863, art. 14, reprinted in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 161 [hereinafter Lieber's Code]. See generally RICHARD S. HARTIGAN,
LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR (1983). On April 24, 1863, the U.S. War Depart-
ment published General Orders No. 100, which has become known as Lieber's Code.
Lieber's Code was the "first instance in western history" that a sovereign nation established
formal guidelines for its army concerning conduct toward its enemies. Id. at 1-2.
75. Lieber's Code, supra note 74, art. 16.
76. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 129 (2d ed. 1992).
77. Walter D. Reed, Teaching the Law of War in the Military, 16 A.F. L. REV. 70, 74
(1974).
78. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 396
(Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
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admitting of no delay, for the taking by a commander of measures,
which are indispensable for forcing as quickly as possible the
complete surrender of the enemy by means of regulated violence,
and which are not forbidden by the laws and customs of war."79
Historian Geoffrey Best quotes yet another definition from the
U.S. Air Force Law of War Manual: "Military neces-
sity ... justifies measures of regulated force not forbidden by
international law which are indispensible [sic] for securing the
prompt submission of the enemy, with the least possible expendi-
tures of economic and human resources." 8
The previous paragraph in the Air Force manual may be more
telling because it places military necessity in perspective and relates
it to humanitarian considerations. The Air Force manual states:
The law of armed conflict is essentially inspired by the humani-
tarian desire of civilised nations to diminish the effects of
conflicts. It protects both combatants and non-combatants from
unnecessary suffering, and safeguards the fundamental rights of
civilians, POWs and the wounded and sick. The law also
attempts to prevent degeneration of conflicts into savagery and
brutality, thereby facilitating the restoration of peace and the
friendly nations which must, at some point, inevitably accompa-
ny of follow the conclusion of hostilities. It has been said to
represent in some measure minimum standards of civilization.8'
Aside from the distinction between non-weapon laser systems
and tactical laser weapon systems, there have been efforts to
subdivide tactical laser weapons into anti-materiel and anti-
personnel laser weapons. This subdivision could be effective in
separating out anti-missile lasers. It has been used,.however, to try
to legitimize laser weapons whose function is to blind, and it is
problematic when considering dual-use laser weapons. In battle,
military equipment is a valid target. The problem arises funda-
mentally when tactical laser weapons are used against direct-view
optical devices, such as binoculars. The optical device magnifies
79. Downey, supra note 73, at 254.
80. Geoffrey Best, The Restraint of War in Historical and Philosophical Perspective, in
HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 3, 16 (Astrid J.M.
Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991) (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AFP 110-
31, INTERNATIONAL LAW-THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OPERATIONS I 1-2g
(1976)).
81. Id. at 16 n.15 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, supra
note 80, 1 1-2f).
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the laser beam, which penetrates through to the eye even before
disrupting the optical device. In essence, laser weapons are used
for anti-personnel purposes. The eye damage is not an incidental
or collateral effect of the use of a non-weapon system, such as a
laser rangefinder. Given that the physical properties of lasers for
weapon and non-weapon uses are similar, the distinction lies not
in whether a laser weapon is specifically designed or has the sole
purpose to blind, but whether the weapon's function is to target
eyesight.
Originally, the military considered deployment of tactical laser
weapons during high-intensity, conventional warfare. The use of
tactical blinding laser weapons in this context is questionable and
may only make a minor contribution to the military's capability,
especially in light of increasing use of long-range "smart" weapons
and the superiority of U.S. fire" control systems and guns, as
demonstrated during the Gulf War.82 In addition, operators of
tactical laser weapons need a direct line of sight with the target,
and they may not be able to register direct hits or quickly judge
the effects of the laser beam on the target. Operators-of barreled
weapons or missiles, on the other hand, can determine immediately
whether a target has been hit.83 Therefore, the use of tactical
laser weapons to blind may be considered a tactic to disable
combatants, provided the mark is hit, thus leaving combatants
vulnerable to deadly conventional force.'
Low-intensity conflicts include operations other than war,
special operations and peacekeeping missions. The presence of
electro-optical devices may be minimal in such conflicts. Technical
problems also may arise in carrying out such missions. For
example, the usefulness of lasers in counter-sniper operations
would depend on the laser weapon being on the same axis as the
sniper's scope." If the laser weapon is used in an urban setting,
82. Blinding Laser Weapons, supra note 5, at 16.
83. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 3, at 81.
84. See generally Nick Lewer, Non-Lethal Weapons, 11 MED. & WAR 78 (1995).
According to Colonel Sam Gardiner, a U.S. Department of Defense consultant, the theory
behind the use of non-lethal technologies in the Gulf War would have been to stop the
enemy and then to "go in with conventional weapons and destroy them." Id. at 85.
85. A U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff publication notes that "lasers have a limited off-axis
capability." JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-09.1, JOINT LASER DESIGNATION
PROCEDURES, at 1-1 (1991). The publication also notes that natural and manmade
obscurants, including smoke and dust, may attenuate or reflect the laser beam and
significantly degrade laser systems. Id. at 1-3, 1-7.
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the deflection of the laser beam may cause civilian collateral
damage. In the end, the fundamental problem is that the tactical
laser weapon's mission is to detect and attack direct optics and the
human eye. Blinding is the deliberate intent in high- or low-
intensity conflicts. Declaring that a situation is an "operation other
than war" must not provide a way for the military to circumvent
the principles of humanity. Even in his military legal analysis,
Lieber concluded that those "who take up arms against one
another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral
beings, responsible to one another and to God."86
B. Prohibition Against Superfluous Injury and Unnecessary
Suffering
The totality of a victim's injuries, including the degree of
physical pain, the severity of the wound, the incidence of perma-
nent damage and disfigurement, and the psychological damage,
must be considered in examining the extent of suffering and injury.
Some commentators have included the aggregate suffering or injury
caused to society as a factor in deciding whether to prohibit a
weapon system or method of warfare.8' In considering the use of
blinding tactical laser weapons or blinding as a method of warfare,
the impact on society of a greater number of blinded soldiers
would include the need for more resources for the soldiers'
rehabilitation. It also may include the psychological impact on
society itself from the ethical dilemma of employing particular
weapons aimed at such an important and sensitive part of the
human body. "Unnecessary suffering" and "superfluous injury"
are more abstract and intangible concepts that go beyond the
suffering and injury that may occur generally in armed conflict and
that may be deemed extreme suffering or extensive injury. These
concepts have focused on the inevitability, or perhaps more likely,
the probability of the specific injury and the difficulty in treating
the wounded whose injuries were made more severe by a particular
86. Lieber's Code, supra note 74, art. 15.
87. Cf C. Greenwood, Battlefield Laser Weapons in the Context of the Law on
Conventional Weapons, in ICRC REPORT ON BLINDING WEAPONS, supra note 15, at 71,
76. In his presentation at the first ICRC Roundtable of Experts in 1989, Mr. Greenwood
said that social consequences of an injury seemed to fall outside the concept of injury
under' existing law. Id. "Nevertheless, the social consequences of a particular injury are
a relevant political factor which may influence States in deciding whether to introduce fresh
law prohibiting certain categories of weapon." Id.
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weapon.
In April 1991, the ICRC convened an experts roundtable to
consider the impact of blindness-causing weapons on an individual
and on society.8  Sight is an essential irreplaceable sense, which
provides eighty to ninety percent of a person's sensory stimula-
tion.8 9 No prosthesis exists for a lost eye and rehabilitation mea-
sures are limited, particularly in countries with inadequate
resources. Advanced medical facilities would not be on or near
battlefields and, in any case, would be unlikely to salvage the sight
of individuals whose eyes were injured by lasers. Several experts
at the ICRC meeting believed that sight is "the most precious
sense that persons have and that the loss of it is a very severe
handicap."' The effect of the weapon is not only tied to its effect
on sight, but also to its effect on the other senses, because sight
organizes the other senses and allows people to orient them-
selves.9'
Permanent blindness is a severe disability. U.S. delegates to
the CCW Review Conference repeatedly espoused the argument
that it is better to blind than to kill, but such an argument belittles
the point. It fails to take into account that conventional weapons,
such as rifles, kill only about twenty-five percent of the casualties
or that sudden blindness has a psychological impact. 92 Criteria
established from injuries caused by conventional weapons may
serve as a yardstick. Based on more than 17,000 cases of patients
wounded in armed conflicts and admitted to ICRC hospitals, Dr.
Robin Coupland has drawn up a list of health effects that may be
used to objectively judge whether a weapon system inflicts
superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering.93 Proposed criteria
88. See generally ICRC REPORT ON BLINDING WEAPONS, supra note 15. The April
1991 experts roundtable was the final meeting convened by the ICRC as part of its
examination of laser weapons. Much of the discussion centered on the legal and policy
implications of the use of blinding laser weapons and the consideration of possible legal
regulation. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
89. Discussion on the Lawfulness of the Anti-Personnel Use of Laser Weapons, in
ICRC REPORT ON BLINDING WEAPONS, supra note 15, at 332, 339 [hereinafter Anti-
Personnel Use Discussion].
90. Id. at 336.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 335-36.
93. Robin Coupland, The Effect of Weapons: Defining Superfluous Injury and
Unnecessary Suffering, MED. & GLOBAL SURVIVAL (forthcoming). Dr. Coupland, ICRC
surgical coordinator, first presented this paper at the ICRC's international symposium,
"The Medical Profession and the Effects of Weapons," held in Montreux on March 8-10,
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include the inevitable infliction of permanent disability, the
targeting of a specific part of the human anatomy, physiology or
biochemistry, and the inability to treat the victim's injuries in a
non-specialist facility, all 'of which support a ban on blinding laser
weapons.
Furthermore, humanitarian law permits putting a soldier hors
de combat for the duration of the conflict, but not intentionally for
life-long incapacitation short of death.94 Blinding tactical laser
weapons have the potential to result in a higher rate of life-long
incapacitation than other. conventional weapons. In comparing
laser weapons to other weapons banned in the past, there is a
''certain similarity between a weapon that primarily kills and one
that primarily blinds in that both render the soldier hors de combat
for life." 95  While an object of war may be to put the greatest
number of combatants out of action for the duration of the conflict,
that purpose is exceeded when a weapon or method of warfare is
likely in most cases to cause useless injury and suffering. Because
the characteristics of the human eye are no match for the physical
properties of tactical lasers, eye damage is certain to result.
Specific criteria would show more readily that the use of a
particular weapon causes unnecessary suffering. It also should be
remembered, however, that no objective analysis of unnecessary
suffering led to the nineteenth century and early twentieth century
treaties that banned exploding and expanding bullets or chemical
and biological weapons. As Dr. Coupland states, "[T]hese means
of warfare were simply deemed 'horrific' or 'inhumane.' "96
C. International Response to Blinding Laser Weapons
When the United States was embarking on its development of
tactical laser weapons during the 1970s, delegates to the Lucerne
and Lugano Government Experts' Conferences, which the ICRC
convened, began to discuss the possible development of "future
1996.
94. Anti-Personnel Use Discussion, supra note 89, at 338-39.
95. Id. at 335; see also id. at 338-39. Prohibitions on "dum-dum" bullets and poisoned
weapons support the ideas that weapons, which do more than render a person hors de
combat in the short term, inflict "uselessly cruel" wounds and that certain inevitable long-
term consequences of a weapon are unacceptable. Discussion of the Law Applicable to
the Use of Battlefield Laser Weapons, in ICRC REPORT ON BLINDING WEAPONS, supra
note 15, at 83, 83.
96. Coupland, supra note 93, at 2.
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weapons," including anti-personnel laser weapons.97  Little
information was available about laser weapons and some partici-
pants thought that "such a development was unlikely in the near
future."98  By 1986, however, Sweden and Switzerland decided
during the twenty-fifth International Conference of the Red Cross
and Red Crescent Movement to initiate efforts to ban blinding
laser weapons. Subsequently, the ICRC pursued the issue by
convening four experts' meetings on battlefield laser weapons
between 1989 and 1991. 99 Specialists on laser technology, ophthal-
mology, military medicine, psychiatry and international humanitari-
an law attended these meetings."' From the ICRC's point of
view, these meetings were preventive medicine. ICRC President
Cornelio Sommaruga stated, "Given today's rapid technological
developments, the widespread proliferation of weapons and the
continued eruption of numerous armed conflicts, it is clear that
weapons developments need to be supervised in order to try to
prevent the conflicts of tomorrow wreaking even more suffering
than those of today."''
The ICRC compiled a dossier of evidence showing that
blinding was in fact .more severe and debilitating than most other
97. CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTION-
AL WEAPONS (LUCERNE: SEPT. 24-Ocr. 18, 1974): REPORT (1975); CONFERENCE OF
GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (SECOND
SESSION, LUGANO: JAN. 28-FEB. 26, 1976): REPORT (1976).
98. Doswald-Beck & Cauderay, supra note 69, at 571.
99. See generally ICRC REPORT ON BLINDING LASER WEAPONS, supra note 15.
100. See generally id. During the first meeting in June 1989, the international experts
provided an overview of laser technology and its military uses, the effects of lasers on the
eye, the psychological effects of blindness, and -international humanitarian law related to
anti-personnel use of lasers. The experts decided that the "problems involved were
sufficiently serious to warrant further study." The second meeting analyzed the
characteristics of laser weapons, assessed their possible effects, and considered the medical
ramifications as well as protective measures. The third meeting assessed the physical and
psychological impact of blindness in comparison to other battlefield injuries. The final
meeting in April 1991 gathered 37 government officials from 22 countries, attending in their
personal capacity, and 8 experts who had contributed to earlier meetings. They considered
the policy and legal implications of the use of blinding laser weapons, in particular, whether
the infliction of permanent blindness violated international humanitarian law because it
amounted to cruelty that exceeded any military purpose.
101. Cornelio Sommaruga, Prologue to ICRC REPORT ON BLINDING LASER WEAPONS,
supra note 15, at 11, 11. Mr. Sommaruga said that the ICRC was concerned with the
effects of weapons because of its aim to alleviate the suffering caused by armed conflicts.
Id. The challenge was to try to "supervise developments so that States may take suitable,
preventive action." Id.
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war injuries.'' In modern warfare, it is estimated that fifty
percent of wounded soldiers return to duty within fifty days. In
contrast, soldiers who are blinded never return. In addition to the
blinding or severe eye damage itself, experts said that these soldiers
are likely to suffer greater rates of battlefield stress and post-
traumatic stress syndrome because blinding tactical laser weapons
are a silent and invisible threat.1°3 Although opinions at the
ICRC meetings were not unanimous, the information revealed at
these meetings and in subsequent forums brought laser weapons
more into the public arena and provided important information on
the technology. Such information included the fact that the energy
and wavelength of lasers necessary to destroy sensors were similar
to those able to damage eyes and the belief that it would be nearly
impossible to produce laser weapons that would guarantee only a
dazzling effect. 1°4
Prohibitions against the use of blinding laser weapons may
ultimately rely to a great extent on policy reasons for banning
blinding as a method of warfare and on the simple belief that such
weapons are horrific and therefore unacceptable. The United
States is a case in point. In 1988, the U.S. Department of the
Army concluded that "the use of a laser for the purpose of
blinding an enemy soldier would not constitute unnecessary
suffering" and that the U.S. military considered the use of anti-
personnel laser weapons lawful. °5 Subsequent legal memoranda
on particular tactical laser weapon systems maintained that
position. 1"6 The Department of the Army said that the laser was
102. See ICRC REPORT ON BLINDING LASER WEAPONS, supra note 15, at 43-58, 134-
139, 179-183, 336-338.
103. Id. at 43-58, 134-139, 179-183, 336-338.
104. Id. at 43-51.
105. Memorandum of Law from Hugh R. Overholt, Judge Advocate General, Office of
the Judge Advocate General, U.S. Department of the Army, on The Use of Lasers as
Antipersonnel Weapons (Sept. 29, 1988) [hereinafter Memorandum of Law].
106. E.g., Memorandum from W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant for the Law of War
Matters, Office of the Judge Advocate General, U.S. Department of the Army, on the
AN/PLQ-5 Laser Countermeasure System and Law of War Review to Ken Sines,
Directorate of Combat Developments, Electronics and Special Developments Division, U.S.
Army Infantry School and William Smith, Project Manager, Night Vision and Electro-
Optics (Sept. 16, 1994) [hereinafter AN/PLQ-5 Memo]. This memorandum uses language
that is similar to the 1988 memorandum: "antipersonnel use of a laser does not cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, even if it results in permanent blindness, and
that antipersonnel laser use was consistent with the law of war obligations of the United
States." Id. at 3.
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unique because of its "non-lethality"' 7 and because it would
"only cause harm to a combatant by injury (temporary or perma-
nent) to his or her sight."'" In summary, the Department of the
Army decided that anti-personnel laser injury was "more humane"
than injury caused by comparable weapons; that the use of
protective gear and defensive action could minimize potential laser
injuries; that the weapons had not been designed with the sole
purpose of producing permanent injury to combatants; that their
increased power had militarily useful effects; and that wounds that
last beyond the duration of hostilities are commonplace and "there
exists no law of war obligation to design weapons along lines to the
contrary.' ' 1°9
By early 1995, however, at least twenty-five state governments
supported a ban on blinding tactical laser weapons."' Moreover,
despite official U.S. opposition to any regulations prior to the
September 1995 Department of Defense policy announcement,
some segments of the Department of Defense also disavowed
blinding. Most often, the Department of Defense expressed its
abhorrence to blinding as a tool in warfare by repeating that it was
not developing laser weapons designed to blind.11' A U.S.
107. Politicians and military officials periodically attempt to categorize blinding laser
weapons as non-lethal or less-than-lethal weapons. Interest in developing non-lethal
weapons arose in the context of trying to make military operations more palatable to the
public and to find alternatives to the use of lethal force, especially with the rising number
of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions. See, e.g., Mark Fischetti, Less-
than-Lethal Weapons, TECH. REV., Jan. 1995, at 14; see also supra note 14.
108. AN/PLQ-5 Memo, supra note 106, at 6. An information sheet on the Dazer,
another laser weapon system, states that the system can be highly dangerous to users and
that the laser beam itself is hazardous to the eyes. U.S. Blinding Lasers, supra note 5, at
11 (citing U.S. Special Operations Command, Dazer System Fact Sheet). Furthermore, the
information sheet states that there are no approved safety procedures to minimize the
danger of the Dazer. Id. at 11 (citing U.S. Special Operations Command, Dazer System
Fact Sheet).
109. Memorandum of Law, supra note 105, at 6.
110. Arkin, supra note 25, at 20; Colman McCarthy, Battlefield Instruments of Blindness,
WASH. POST, May 16, 1995, at E24.
111. The Department of Defense "does not possess, nor is it developing, laser weapons
designed or intended primarily to permanently blind enemy combatants. However, one
presently unfunded program investigated the potential for use of lasers to temporarily
impair vision." Letter from H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of Defense, to Lane
Evans, Member of Congress (Mar. 27, 1995). Cf U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, THE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (1995). The handbook
states that directed energy devices, which include lasers, may be used "directly against
combatants as an antipersonnel weapon. Their use does not violate the prohibition against
the infliction of unnecessary suffering." Id. at 9-3.
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Marine Corps document also revealed the concerns raised by laser
weapons in the hands of battlefield opponents simply because they
could cause permanent blindness.' 12 Therefore, some commenta-
tors characterize as too simplistic the notion that anti-personnel
laser injuries, specifically blindness and severe eye damage, would
be more humane than other injuries."3
In addition, the dual-use capabilities of tactical laser weapons
mean that these weapons by their nature have more than one
purpose. Nevertheless, the Department of Defense did not
formally support an international protocol regarding laser weapons
until the issuance of its policy guidance statement on laser weapons
in September 1995.114 In the statement, the Department of De-
fense prohibited the use of lasers specifically designed to cause
permanent blindness of unenhanced vision. Secretary Perry had
found little support among senior military officers for either the
utility or appropriateness of blinding as a method of warfare.
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Jan Lodal perhaps
summed up the position best: "So, whether legal or not, it seemed
something that many people were uncomfortable with and for
which there were no ascertainable military requirements."'
1 5
Senior Pentagon officials described Secretary Perry's policy
guidance statement as a major shift in Department of Defense
policy, intended to establish that blinding as a method of warfare
was unacceptable."6
D. Protocol IV.- A Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons
Protocol IV, which was added to the Convention on Conven-
tional Weapons in 1995, bans the use and transfer of laser weapons
112. Mission Need Statement, supra note 49, at 1.
113. Greenwood, supra note 87, at 80.
114. In February 1995, seven months before the Department of Defense policy
statement, President Clinton told congressional members who had urged a ban on blinding
laser weapons that he did not believe international negotiations should pursue the issue
because they risked "diverting attention from the more immediate humanitarian problem
of anti-personnel landmines." Letter from Bill Clinton, President, to Ronald Dellums,
Member of Congress (Feb. 1, 1995); Letter from Bill Clinton, President, to Lane Evans,
Member of Congress (Feb. 1, 1995); Letter from Bill Clinton, President, to Patrick Leahy,
Senator (Feb. 1, 1995). President Clinton's rationale is unconvincing because these
congressmen have been in the forefront of the campaign to ban landmines and they have
been strong supporters of a laser weapons protocol.
115. Bradley Graham, Pentagon Shifts, Seeks Laser Weapons Curbs, WASH. POST, Sept.
20, 1995, at A3.
116. Blinding Laser Weapons, supra note 5, at 5.
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"specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of
their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unen-
hanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective
eyesight devices."' 7 Nations must take "all feasible precautions"
to avoid blinding the naked eye." 8 Protocol IV does not cover
blinding "as an incidental or collateral effect of the legitimate
military employment of laser systems," including lasers Used against
optical equipment." 9 This segment of Protocol IV was originally
proposed to allow for the continued use of non-weapon laser
systems, yet such systems are not specifically named. The
provision regarding the use of lasers against optical equipment was
incorporated during the final week of negotiations on Protocol IV
and created a significant exemption for laser weapons that in fact
target the eye.
During the Review Conference of the CCW, the United States
and the United Kingdom opposed an explicit prohibition on
blinding as a method of warfare, despite support for such a ban
from numerous countries, including France and Germany. The
United States even took exception to final committee meeting
statements by several delegations that Protocol IV prohibited
deliberate blinding. Mexico said that it accepted Protocol IV
because it prohibited "blinding deliberately as a means or method
of warfare."' 2 ° Ecuador said that Protocol IV "prohibits the use
of permanent blinding as a weapon, method or means of war."'
121
Iran said that it interpreted Protocol IV to consider any intentional
blinding with lasers in battle illegal.2 2 France said that it would
have preferred an explicit prohibition banning "deliberate blinding
117. Protocol IV, supra note 6, art: 1. The language banning laser weapons specifically
designed to cause permanent blindness is a mirror image of the Department of Defense
policy announced in September 1995. Id. Delegates at the CCW Review Conference
began with a draft that emerged from the Group of Governmenf Experts negotiations,
which concluded in January 1995. Part of the draft prohibited the use of laser beams "of
a nature to cause permanent blindness [serious damage] against the eyesight of persons as
a method of warfare." The ICRC had proposed a two-part protocol stating that "blinding
as a method of warfare is prohibited" and "laser weapons may not be used against the
eyesight of persons."
118. Id. art. 2
119. Id. art. 3.
120. Statements Made During Final Public Meeting of Main Committee III of the CCW
Review Conference (Oct. 1995).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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as a method of warfare., 123
The United States and the United Kingdom argued that such
an explicit prohibition could bring in the issue of "intent," and they
feared that their soldiers would be. subject to war crimes charges if
they accidentally blinded an individual. Germany, however,
pointed out that countries opposing an explicit prohibition should
be more concerned about their soldiers becoming victims of
blinding lasers than being branded as war criminals. The issue of
intent is not unchartered waters. In both criminal law and
humanitarian law, certain prohibited actions require that the
element of intent be proven. Also, the Protocol IV draft text
already had an exception for blinding as an incidental or collateral
effect of the legitimate use of lasers on the battlefield. Therefore,
if a soldier accidentally blinded an individual with a non-weapon
laser system, such as a rangefinder or target designator, the soldier
would be protected. By failing to establish more explicit language
against blinding, nations failed to protect their soldiers more
effectively. The United States, in particular, argued that the term
"method of warfare" was ambiguous, even though the term has
been used in numerous international agreements, including
Additional Protocol I, which contained an entire section titled
"methods and means of warfare. ' 124  By comparison, France
plainly told the opening plenary that blinding as a method of
warfare was a perversion.
Despite Secretary Perry's more far-reaching intent and other
nations' desire for a more comprehensive ban, the U.S. delegation
worked to keep the language of the new international agreement
as narrow as possible. The preliminary U.S. legal analysis of
Protocol IV, signed for the Judge Advocate General, also charac-
terized the agreement in such a way that countries could have used
the memorandum to liberally interpret or even violate the letter as
well as the spirit of the ban on blinding laser weapons.1 25 One
troublesome interpretation in the memorandum was that State
Parties at the Review Conference had not concluded that "use of
a laser to blind an enemy combatant causes unnecessary suffering,
123. Id. In a reply to parliamentary questions a month earlier, the French president
indicated that France supported the total prohibition of deliberate blinding as a method of
warfare. Id.
124. Additional Protocol I, supra note 60.
125. Effect of Laser Protocol Memo, supra note 9; see also Letter to Perry, supra note
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or that use of a laser to blind an individual enemy combatant was
illegal."'26 Senator Leahy and Representative Evans told Secre-
tary Perry. that this interpretation would render the protocol
"meaningless and encourage other nation's [sic] to liberally
interpret its restrictions.', 27 A prohibition against a weapon that
is "specifically designed" to blind contradicts a conclusion that it is
legal to blind. Such a contradiction supports some commentators
who contend that the laws of armed conflict are so vaguely worded
and permissive as to enable "powerful states to use the latest
military technology with little regard for humanitarian consequenc-
es.' 28 Fortunately, Secretary Perry reaffirmed the Department of
Defense policy to prohibit the use of weapons specifically designed
to permanently blind and to reduce inadvertent injuries from the
use of non-weapon lasers, for example, in rangefinding, target
discrimination and communications. 129  Further, Secretary Perry
stated that it was not the intent of Protocol IV to prohibit only
mass blinding. He unequivocally stated .that while Protocol IV
does not prohibit research, development and production, the
Department of Defense had "no intent to spend money developing
weapons we are prohibited from using. We certainly would not
want to encourage other countries to loosely interpret the treaty's
prohibitions, by implying that we want to develop or produce
weapons we are prohibited from using.""'3
The cumulative effect of Protocol IV's provisions, country
statements regarding the need for a more comprehensive ban and
the belief in the inappropriateness of blinding reveal that deliberate
blinding has been recognized as beyond the pale and in essence
prohibited. Protocol IV stigmatizes blinding as a method of
126. Effect of Laser Protocol Memo, supra note 9.
127. Letter to Perry, supra note 9.
128. Jochnick & Normand, supra note 1, at 53; see also Leslie C. Green, What One May
Do in Combat-Then and Now, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:
CHALLENGES AHEAD, supra note 80, at 269, 276, 294.
129. Letter to Evans, supra note 11.
130. Id. Regarding the issue of mass versus individual blinding, Senator Leahy and
Representative Evans had criticized the memorandum's interpretation as a "creative and
inaccurate characterization" of the Review Conference proceedings. Letter to Perry, supra
note 9. Senator Leahy and Representative Evans wrote to Secretary perry that an
exception to permit individual blinding had no basis in the protocol or in the negotiations
leading up to the protocol. Id. Secretary Perry eventually agreed with Senator Leahy and
Representative Evans' interpretation regarding individual blinding. Letter to Evans, supra
note 11.
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warfare. The use and transfer of laser weapons specifically
designed to blind are outlawed. In taking all feasible precautions
to avoid the incidence of blindness, countries cannot allow their
commanders to give orders to use, or allow their soldiers to use,
laser weapons to blind. They must train their soldiers to avoid
blinding others when using lasers generally. If laser weapons are
used against direct-view optics, such as binoculars, and combatants
are blinded, the blinding cannot be considered an incidental effect
because the combatants would be harmed before any damage to
the optics.
To welcome the adoption of Protocol IV, the European
Parliament stated in a resolution on November 16, 1995 that it
regretted the lack of a ban on production and the inclusion of
"loopholes for the production, use and transfer of some blinding
laser weapons, including those that target optical systems.
131
The Parliament stated its belief that "blinding as a method of
warfare is abhorrent and in contravention of established custom,
the principles of humanity and the dictates of public con-
science."' 32  In the Review Conference's Final Declaration,
countries further declared "their recognition of the need for-
achieving the total prohibition of blinding laser weapons" and their
wish to continue consideration of the blinding effects of laser
systems.'33 For its part, the United States committed itself to
refrain from using banned laser weapons "at all times," unilaterally
extending Protocol's IV's scope."3
131. European Parliament Joint Motion for a Resolution on Anti-Personnel Landmines
and Laser Weapons, Doc. DOCEN\RE\286286184 (Nov. 15, 1995).
132. Id. The European Parliament called on European Union member states to ratify
Protocol IV, to ban the development and production of blinding laser weapons, and to
begin destruction of existing stocks of blinding laser weapons. Id.
133. Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, CCW/CONF.I/WP.1/Rev.1 (May
1, 1996). More than 50 States Parties and 30 States Observers participated in the final
Review Conference session from April 22 to May 3, 1996.
134. U.S. Ambassador Michael Matheson, Statement at the Final Plenary Session (May
3, 1996). In its closing remarks, the ICRC mentioned its regret that Protocol IV's scope
had not been extended formally as agreed in Vienna in October 1995 and reaffirmed by
countries at the 26th International Conference, of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in
December 1995. The ICRC encouraged all states to issue a "statement of understanding"
that they considered Protocol IV to "apply at all times."
1996]
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IV. LASER TECHNOLOGY AND WEAPONS WITHIN CIVILIAN
LAW ENFORCEMENT
On April 20, 1994, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch
and Attorney General Janet Reno signed a five-year memorandum
of understanding "to formalize an interagency alliance on problems
common to the military and law enforcement communities."' 35
The joint development of technologies was needed in part due to
a shrinking federal budget and the movement of the military into
operations other than war.
The special tactics, training and equipment needed for opera-
tions other than war are, in many cases, similar to the intensified
threat faced by law enforcement agencies due to the widespread
availability of increasingly powerful weapons, rising violence and
continuing distribution of illegal drugs. In addition, in most
cases, military rules of engagement for operations other than
war place severe limitations on casualties and collateral dam-
age.
136
Laser technology is an open field for law enforcement
development. As recently as March 1996, the military briefed
National Institute of Justice officials on converting such technology
to police use. 37 Non7-weapon laser technology could be used to
measure distances, illuminate targets, or enhance night vision
135. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), U.S. Department of
Defense, News Release, Departments of Defense and Justice Sign Memorandum of Under-
standing (Apr. 20, 1994).
136. Id.
137. One aim of the National Institute of Justice, a Department of Justice branch, is to
find alternatives to the use of lethal force for police and correctional officers. See Lois
Pilant, Less-than-Lethal Weapons: New Solutions for Law Enforcement, SCI. & TECH. (Int'l
Ass'n of Chiefs of Police, Alexandria, VA), Dec. 1993, at 1, 1. Some of the primary less-
than-lethal force weapons that police use include electronic stun devices, such as Tasers,
other stun guns, and stun gloves; chemical weapons, such as Mace; and close-range impact
weapons, such as flashlights and batons. Neal Miller, Less-than-Lethal Force Weaponry:
Law Enforcement and Correctional Agency Civil Law Liability for the Use of Excessive
Force, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 733, 736 & n.4 (1995). There has been disagreement about
the designation of certain devices as non-lethal or less-than-lethal technology due to either
their dffects or their use against certain body parts. For'example, some law enforcement
agencies have classified stun guns or impact devices as lethal weapons rather than less-than-
lethal force weapons. The police department in Kettering, Ohio has listed several areas
of the body where baton use may result in death: temple, ears, eyes, bridge of nose, upper
lip, throat, solar plexus, groin, back of neck, hollow behind ear, kidney, and tail bone. Id.
at 736 n.4.
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devices. 38 The New York City Police Department and the
Arapaho City Sheriff's Department have used laser technology to
target suspects and to encourage them to break off their activi-
ties. 139 The police can aim a device similar to a laser designator
at the chest of suspects, such as snipers or hostage holders, to let
them know that they are within range. Correctional institutions
have also used such systems to discourage riots.14 ° Lights, such
as flash bangs or pulsating strobes, have been used to temporarily
blind or disorient individuals.' In that respect, lasers that target
the eyes are seen possibly as an extension of those technologies.
For example, Lockheed Sanders, the manufacturer of the LCMS
for the U.S. Army, stated in its advertising literature that anti-
narcotics operations and hostage crisis situations were among the
typical scenarios for use of the LCMS.1
42
The push toward developing less-than-lethal technologies
began more than twenty years ago, and it gained new impetus with
the 1985 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Tennessee v. Garner.
43
In that case, the Supreme Court held that the use of deadly force
to apprehend an apparently unarmed, non-violent fleeing felon was
an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.1" Calls for the use of less-than-lethal force were
heard again and commissions were appointed to investigate the
issue in the aftermath of the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles
and the Branch Davidians standoff outside Waco, Texas. After
Waco, Attorney General Janet Reno called for greater efforts and
more funding to provide law enforcement with alternative tools to
138. The Institute for Law and Justice, which the National Institute of Justice funds, did
not list lasers as a type of less-than-lethal technology, even though bright white and pulsed
lights were mentioned in that category. Types of Less-Than-Lethal Weapons, L.
ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS (Inst. for Law & Justice, Alexandria, VA), Jan. 1995, at 6, 6-8.
139. Pilant, supra note 137, at 4.
140. Interview with David Boyd, Director of Science and Technology at the National
Institute of Justice (Apr. 8, 1996).
141. So far, more attention has been focused on the use of pulsed, or strobe, light, which
either a fixed or portable unit may produce. Such devices may be used in situations rang-
ing from hostage or barricade situations to prison riots or fights. These different types of
light may be used to "distract, disorient and possibly disable." Pilant, supra note 137, at
4.
142. U.S. Blinding Lasers, supra note 5, at 9 (citing Lockheed Sanders, Laser
Countermeasure System (LCMS) Fact Sheet (1994)).
143. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
144. Id.
19961 763
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
subdue suspects or inmates.141 The search for such tools has
been characterized as "an effort to find tools or devices that
subdue subjects without harm."' 46
The use of laser technology against a person's eyes raises even
more questions in the civilian context than in the military context.
Civilian law enforcement is waiting to determine the safety
standards of such devices and to decide whether they would be a
"genuine improvement" over currently available technology.147
Some experts, including biophysicists specializing in lasers, are
skeptical about the ability to design a laser weapon that would be
guaranteed to only dazzle."4 It perhaps is more important for
civilian law enforcement to decide that such a weapon should not
be used to target one of the most critical parts of the human
anatomy.
Guidelines for the use of other less-than-lethal technologies
and a public revulsion against targeting a person's eyes bolster the
decision against the use of such a weapon in the civilian context.
These guidelines emphasize the need for law enforcement to avoid
injuring the eyes when using less-than-lethal technologies. For
example, guidelines for the use of Mace or other chemical irritants
prohibit their use in confined areas or directly into the eyes or
body orifices.' 49 Firing chemical spray directly into the face and
eyes may cause permanent loss of sight and other injuries and is
considered a negligent use of a less-than-lethal technology. 5 °
Exposure to high dosages of chemical spray in an enclosed space
also may result in vision loss. These examples illustrate the impor-
tance placed on the need to avoid blinding.
The use of laser weapons is not yet an accepted idea or
practice in civilian law enforcement, partially because the technolo-
gy is not widely available and partially because lasers have the
ability to blind or severely damage eyes. For the latter reason, the
use of laser weapons should not become part of law enforcement
145. Pilant, supra note 137, at 1-2.
146. Id. at 2.
147. Interview with David Boyd, supra note 140.
148. Blinding Laser Weapons, supra note 5, at 23 (citing Bengt Anderberg & Myron
Wolbarsht, Hand-Held Laser Weapons Are Waiting in the Wings, ARMED FORCES J. INT'L,
May 1992); see also John Marshall, A Horrifying New Laser Weapon that the World Should
Ban Now, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 12, 1995, Opinion.
149. Miller, supra note 137, at 775.
150. Id.
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tactics. To paraphrase Attorney General Reno, the military's
standard for the use of less-than-lethal technologies is generally
one of minimizing collateral damage, while law enforcement's
standard is the elimination of any collateral damage. In 1993,
Attorney General Reno said:
When less than lethal technologies are used by law enforcement,
remember that they're not being used against an enemy; they're
being used to help protect fellow citizens. When police use
these devices, they must be constrained by the knowledge that
the people they are restraining aren't enemies; they are fellow
citizens, with a full set of civil rights.'
V. CONCLUSION
The mere belief that law places humane limits on war has
"profound consequences for the way people view war, and
therefore the way that war is conducted." '52 Military command-
ers and soldiers do not have unlimited choices as to the weapons
and tactics that they employ. The military necessity of a weapon
must be balanced against the injury and consequences to the
individual and to society. The legal principles stemming from the
St. Petersburg Declaration have banned classes of weapons and
methods of warfare that are deemed likely to cause suffering and
injury so excessive that their use is never justified. In this context,
chemical weapons have been banned because their use would be
widely condemned even though they may be considered militarily
helpful or capable of disabling large numbers of combatants. A
weapon that the military perceives as useful will not be permitted
if it inflicts suffering or injuries that are considered outside the
bounds of acceptable behavior. Countries have balanced deliberate
blinding against military utility and opted for new specific prohibi-
tions. In addition, countries generally have agreed that non-
weapon laser systems, such as rangefinders and target designators,
should not be misused to blind.
Blinding laser weapons have no place in armed conflicts or in
police operations. In modern warfare, fifty percent of wounded
soldiers generally return to duty within fifty days. By comparison,
151. Attorney General Janet Reno (delivered on Attorney General Reno's behalf by
David Boyd), Speech to the Non-Lethal Defense Seminar at the Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory (Nov. 17, 1993).
152. Jochnick & Normand, supra note 1, at 56.
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blinding is permanent. While blinding has occurred as an injury in
war through the generations, the physical properties of laser
weapons and the characteristics of the eye combine to specifically
target a highly sensitive and important part of the body. Deliber-
ate blinding cannot justify whatever minimal military utility may be
gained in the short run, given the profound long-term effects of
permanently blinding soldiers with lasers.
The Pentagon has maintained that laser weapon systems, such
as the now-cancelled LCMS, are legitimate and not anti-personnel
weapons because they are "not intended to be used to produce
permanent blindness ... [but are] designed to locate and destroy
enemy optical and electro-optical systems." '53 It is disingenuous
to rely on such semantics, saying that a weapon was not "specifical-
ly designed" or was not designed with the "sole purpose" to blind,
when in fact the weapon's function is to blind. Through the ban
on certain blinding laser weapons and imposition of obligations
upon countries to avoid incidents of blinding, the international
community stigmatized deliberate blinding. During the internation-
al negotiations toward Protocol IV, the participants disagreed over
whether existing international law prohibited the use of laser
weapons against individuals, as noted in U.S. legal memoranda
stressing the legality of such use and blinding. Eventually,
however, countries negotiated and agreed on Protocol IV.
"Dictates of public conscience" must have been among the factors
that prompted countries to prohibit these weapons and to impose
additional obligations upon themselves. There was a sense of
social unacceptability in the notion of intentional blinding that
perhaps went beyond the principle of unnecessary suffering. The
ban on certain laser weapons, the obligations to avoid incidents of
blinding, and countries' statements supporting a more comprehen-
sive regime, including a ban on blinding as a method of warfare,
point to a recognition that deliberate blinding of combatants is not
permissible. Even though the production of such weapons is not
prohibited, these measures will go a long way to curtail the
proliferation of a new generation of conventional weapons consid-
ered inhumane by international standards.
153. Letter from H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of Defense, to Lane Evans,
Member of Congress (July 18, 1995); see also Letter from Gilbert F. Decker, Assistant
Secretary of the Army, Research, Development and Acquisition, to Human Rights Watch
(July 7, 1995).
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